How does the alcohol industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review by Savell, Emily et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Savell, E, Fooks, G & Gilmore, AB 2016, 'How does the alcohol industry attempt to influence marketing
regulations? A systematic review', Addiction, vol. 111, no. 1, pp. 18-32. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.13048
DOI:
10.1111/add.13048
Publication date:
2016
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication
Publisher Rights
CC BY
This is the peer-reviewed version of the following article: Savell, E, Fooks, G & Gilmore, AB 2015, 'How does the
alcohol industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review' Addiction., which has been
published in final form at: 10.1111/add.13048.  This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in
accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
1 
 
How does the alcohol industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review 
Savell, E.1,2*, Fooks, G.3, and Gilmore, A.B.1,2, 
1 Department for Health, University of Bath, UK  
2 UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies, Bath, UK 
3 School of Languages and Social Science, Aston University, UK 
 
* Corresponding author: Emily Savell, e.savell@bath.ac.uk   
 
Word count (excluding abstract, tables, boxes, competing interests, references): 4,445 
 
 
Competing interests and funding  
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.  
This work is supported by the National Cancer Institute of the United States National Institutes of 
Health (Grant Number R01CA160695). ES is supported by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(Grant Number ES/I900284/1).  
All authors are members of the UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies (UKCTAS), a UK Centre for 
Public Health Excellence which is supported by the British Heart Foundation, Cancer Research UK, the 
Economic and Social Research Council, the Medical Research Council and the National Institute of 
Health Research, under the auspices of the UK Clinical Research Collaboration.   
The funders played no role in the study design, analysis and interpretation of data, nor writing of the 
report or the decision to submit the article for publication. The content is solely the responsibility of 
the authors and does not necessarily represent the views of the funders. 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
Aim: To systematically review, using a qualitative, narrative synthesis approach, articles examining 
alcohol industry efforts to influence alcohol marketing policy, and compare with those used by the 
tobacco industry. 
Methods: Literature searches were conducted between April and July 2011, and updated in March 
2013. Articles were included if they: made reference to alcohol industry efforts to influence a) policy 
debates concerning marketing regulations or b) new specific marketing policies or c) broad alcohol 
policy which included marketing regulations; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990-
2013. Alcohol industry political activity was categorised into strategies/tactics and frames/arguments. 
Data extraction was undertaken by the lead author and 100% of the articles were fully second 
reviewed. Seventeen articles met the review criteria. 
Results: Five main political strategies and five main frames were identified. The alcohol industry 
argues against marketing regulation by emphasising industry responsibility and the effectiveness of 
self-regulation, questioning the effectiveness of statutory regulation, and by focussing on individual 
responsibility. Arguments relating to industry responsibility are often reinforced through corporate 
social responsibility activities. The industry primarily conveys its arguments through manipulating the 
evidence base and by promoting ineffective voluntary codes and non-regulatory initiatives. 
Conclusions: The alcohol industry’s political activity is more varied than existing models of corporate 
political activity suggest. The industry’s opposition to marketing regulation centres on claims that the 
industry is responsible and that self regulation is effective. There are considerable commonalities 
between tobacco and alcohol industry political activity, with differences potentially due to differences 
in policy contexts and perceived industry legitimacy.  
 
Abstract word count: 252 
Keywords: Systematic review; Alcohol industry; Tobacco industry; Marketing regulation; Marketing 
policy, Corporate political activity; Corporate policy influence; Framing 
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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding how large corporations seek to shape health policy has been considerably advanced 
by the release of millions of internal tobacco industry (TI) documents following litigation in the USA[2-
4]. Over 850 peer reviewed papers[5] have now been published examining TI political activity, 
including a growing number of systematic reviews[1, 6, 7] which provide detailed overviews of how 
the TI seeks to influence policy. Research on alcohol industry (AI) political activity is more case study 
based and, without access to previously confidential industry documents, awareness of the AI’s 
political activity is less developed[8, 9]. This is reflected in differences in how public institutions, such 
as the World Health Organisation (WHO), engage with the TI and AI. In respect of the TI, Article 5.3 of 
the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC, the WHO’s first global public health 
treaty) requires all Parties to protect health policies “from commercial and other vested interests of 
the tobacco industry”[10] and guidelines for this Article identify the need to actively monitor and 
expose TI conduct[11]. By contrast,  the WHO’s approach to the AI is more ambiguous; highlighting 
the importance of protecting the development of health policies from “commercial or vested 
interests”[12] on the one hand, whilst allowing AI participation[13] on the other. This is despite 
research illustrating parallels between the political activities of ‘Big Tobacco’ and ‘Big Booze’[14]. 
This paper aims to systematically review the tactics (political techniques) and arguments the AI uses 
to influence public policy relating to alcohol marketing. This focus is chosen for two reasons. First AI 
marketing is known to significantly influence drinking initiation and prevalence[15-18] and restrictions 
on alcohol marketing are a key element of alcohol control[19-21]. Second, it provides a basis for 
making comparisons with TI efforts to influence marketing policies which were systematically 
reviewed in a paper published in 2014[1]. The TI review built on existing methods for categorising 
corporate political activity in the management literature[22] by classifying both the strategies/tactics 
and frames/arguments the TI uses in efforts to oppose marketing policies. The present paper applies 
and develops the TI framework to the AI. It aims to provide a tool for public health advocates and 
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policymakers to understand, predict, and potentially counter the AI’s efforts to influence alcohol 
policy. Our approach responds to a recent recommendation that “investigations of the strategies of 
alcohol industry actors may benefit from comparisons with other industries, and particularly with the 
tobacco industry”[23].  
METHODS 
This review aimed to identify all articles (based on either primary or secondary data) that examined 
AI attempts to influence marketing regulation from 1990 to 2013. The AI comprises large multinational 
companies and tiny specialist brewers, and both on- and off-trade businesses (sales for consumption 
‘on’ the premises and ‘off’ the premises, respectively). In this review we include tactics and arguments 
used by alcohol producers or groups representing producers. Marketing encompasses five key 
variables: product, promotion, price, place, and person[24]. Political activity in respect of tax (which 
affects price) was excluded from the TI systematic review[1] as a systematic review of TI influence on 
tobacco tax had already been completed[6], so for comparative purposes it was also excluded from 
this review. However, efforts to influence minimum unit pricing of alcohol were included under price. 
The databases Web of Knowledge (which includes Web of Science, BIOSIS Previews, and MEDLINE), 
Business Source Premier, and Embase were searched using the search string: (corporat* OR industr* 
OR compan* OR busines* OR firm*) AND (alcohol OR drink) AND (marketing OR advertis* OR sponsor*) 
AND (regulat* OR policy OR legislat*). The search engine Google was used to identify grey literature 
and experts were contacted to identify any additional literature (more information is available in 
Appendix S1). All searches were conducted between April and July 2011, and were updated in March 
2013. Searches were limited to articles from 1990 to 2013 and those written in English. The search 
protocol was developed in conjunction with a qualified librarian.  
Initial study inclusion/exclusion criteria were piloted and were discussed extensively between all three 
authors. The final inclusion/exclusion criteria used in this review can be seen in Box 1. In total 917 
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articles were identified, of which 670 were excluded based on their title and abstract alone. 239 
articles were downloaded for full analysis (8 articles could not be located despite efforts to contact 
the authors). 222 articles were excluded for not meeting the inclusion criteria. The remaining 17 
articles met all of the criteria and were included within the review.  
(BOX 1) 
Data extraction (Appendix S1) was undertaken by the lead author, and 100% of the included articles 
were second-reviewed by either the second or third author to check that all the inclusion criteria were 
met and to agree tactic and argument categorisation. Any differences were discussed between all 
three authors. Disagreements related only to categorisation, more often in relation to the 
categorisation of arguments than tactics. Where disagreement occurred, all evidence falling under 
that particular category was re-reviewed by all three authors until agreement had been reached. 
Narrative synthesis was undertaken to combine the evidence from the articles. 
Unlike the TI review[1] which was based solely on secondary data, this review is based on both primary 
and secondary data. Primary data came predominantly from a UK parliamentary inquiry into alcohol 
where four producers and their communications agencies were asked to provide documents relating 
to five brands and were questioned by MPs from the Health Select Committee; many additional 
companies, trade groups and social aspect organisations (SAOs) also provided written evidence[25-
27]. Additionally, due to a lack of evidence focusing specifically on AI efforts to influence marketing 
regulations, the review was expanded to include AI influence on marketing policy debates alongside 
their influence on specific marketing regulations as per the TI review[1].  
FRAMEWORK OF CLASSIFICATION 
AI political activity was divided into ‘strategies’ containing individual ‘tactics’ (the methods by which a 
corporation attempts to exert influence) and ‘frames’ containing individual ‘arguments’ (the reasons 
given by a corporation as to why they oppose one idea or support another). The system of 
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classification developed in an earlier systematic review of TI political activity[1] (which in turn had 
partly been based on Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) paper[22]) was used as an initial framework to code AI 
political activity. Coding categories (strategies/tactics and frames/arguments) were amended and 
developed via ‘emergent coding’[35]. This was an iterative process and the frameworks were only 
finalised after all the papers had been reviewed as described above. Once the framework of political 
activity was finalised, the strategies/tactics and frames/arguments used by the AI were compared to 
those identified in the systematic review of TI political activity[1]. 
The geographical distribution of where tactics and arguments were used was also recorded. If the 
article included was transnational, the geography of where the individual tactics and arguments were 
used was listed. For example, the article by Casswell and Thamarangsi[28] is a transnational study, but 
the ‘free market economy’ argument was used in France. 
RESULTS 
GEOGRAPHY 
In total 17 articles met our inclusion criteria. A quarter (24%) of the articles focussed on Europe, and 
a further quarter (24%) were transnational (Table 1). No articles focussed on AI conduct in South 
America. 
(TABLE 1) 
ARGUMENTS AND TACTICS 
AI tactics used to influence marketing regulation 
This review identified 20 separate tactics falling under five main strategies (Table 2) which we have 
termed as follows: ‘Information’ (providing or misrepresenting evidence), ‘Constituency building’ 
(forming alliances with other sectors, organisations, or the public to give the impression of larger 
support for the industry’s position), ‘Policy substitution, development and implementation’ 
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(proposing, supporting or helping to implement alternative policies), ‘Legal’ (using the legal system), 
and ‘Financial incentive or disincentive’ (offering direct or indirect monetary incentives or threatening 
financial withdrawal) (see further details included in Appendix S1).    
 (TABLE 2) 
A variety of Information strategies were used across multiple jurisdictions. These include direct[29-
31] and indirect[29] lobbying of policymakers and establishing collaborative working arrangements 
with policymakers[29], and a variety of efforts aimed at shaping and manipulating the evidence base. 
The latter included commissioning, writing or disseminating research/publications[27, 30, 32] or more 
technical reports[30-32], the selective citation[27, 32] and omission of evidence[29], contesting the 
evidence used to support policy[27, 32], and the efforts to remove “troubling” phrases such as 
‘‘alcohol and other drugs’’ from the official lexicon[32]. The AI-funded International Center for Alcohol 
Policies (ICAP) has played a key part in such efforts: commissioning and publishing a large number of 
books, monographs, briefing papers, in-depth reviews of alcohol policy issues, journal articles, and 
policy guides on all manner of alcohol-related issues[32]. These activities have populated the evidence 
base with non-peer reviewed research which, amongst other things, tends to highlight the health 
benefits of alcohol[27, 32] and omit evidence of its negative health and social effects[29].  
Constituency Building was often linked to indirect lobbying. The AI creates front groups, astroturf 
organisations1, or SAOs (such as ICAP[32], the Portman Group[34], The DrinkAware Trust[27], and the 
Federation on Alcohol Concern of Thailand (FACT) established during the formation of an advertising 
ban in 2006[30]) to lobby on its behalf[30, 35]. It also forms alliances with other industry sectors or 
trade organisations[30, 35, 36], and civil society organisations, consumers, or employees[30, 35] in 
order to oppose public health measures[36]. In Thailand the AI worked with groups such as the Thai 
Retail Association, the Hotel Association, the Restaurant Association, the Tourism Association, and the 
                                                          
1 Astroturf organisations can be defined as “fake grassroots organizations usually created and/or sponsored by 
large corporations to support any arguments or claims in their favor, or to challenge and deny those against 
them”[33] 
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Marketing Association of Thailand[30], and in the USA it reached out to the Federal Trade 
Commission[35] and built partnerships with government departments, NGOs, universities, 
researchers, and physicians[35]. The AI also uses media advocacy, such as press launches[31] and 
seminars[30], to shape the news and public agenda. 
Policy substitution, used to prevent the implementation of formal marketing regulations, appears to 
be a key strategy and has been documented globally[27-32, 34, 35, 37-39]. For example, in Lesotho, 
Malawi, Uganda and Botswana SAB-Miller Africa was given de facto responsibility for drafting national 
alcohol policy documents[29]. These policy documents focussed on self-regulatory measures, 
education campaigns, and gave responsibility for the policy’s implementation to a National Alcohol 
Council on which AI representatives served[29]. The promotion of self-regulatory measures is 
designed to reduce political pressure for and pre-empt formal regulation and was identified in 
numerous jurisdictions. For example, we found evidence of voluntary codes being developed and 
promoted by individual companies[27, 35] and by industry groups in the UK[27, 34], Ireland[31], the 
Netherlands[38], and transnationally[28].Another technique involves the promotion of non-
regulatory initiatives such as education programmes[27, 29, 32, 35, 39] delivered through stand-alone 
websites (for example, SABMiller’s www.TalkingAlcohol.com[27]) or more developed corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) initiatives. For example, Diageo’s Responsible Drinking Fund, which in 2009 
claimed to have led or supported over 130 prevention programmes in over 40 countries, covering 
“education, public awareness, and responsible retail practices”[35]. 
Using or raising the prospect of legal action against a proposed regulation was only documented in 
Thailand[30] and France[28], but there is also evidence of the AI attempting to shape international 
trade and investment agreements (specifically the General Agreement on Trade in Services with a view 
to reducing restrictions on alcohol distribution and advertising[28]). We also documented one 
example of the AI using its marketing budget as a lever of policy influence (financial disincentive); in 
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Thailand the AI ”threatened to withdraw sports sponsorship in retaliation for [an] advertising 
ban”[30]. 
AI arguments used to influence marketing regulation  
This review identified 20 separate arguments grouped into five main frames (Table 3): ‘Regulatory 
Redundancy’ (asserting that proposed policies are unnecessary) ,‘Legal’ (questioning the legality of 
policies (the implicit cost for government)), ‘Negative Unintended Consequences’ (direct and indirect 
compliance costs associated with proposed policies), ‘Complex Policy Area’ (policies, and the issues 
surrounding them, are presented as highly complicated), and ‘Insufficient Evidence’ (questioning the 
strength of evidence supporting policies) (see Appendix S1 for further details). 
 (TABLE 3) 
The argument that population-level health measures are unnecessary (regulatory redundancy frame) 
is developed through a wide range of mutually reinforcing arguments which rest on industry claims of 
its own responsibility, its ability to market alcohol responsibly, and its distinction between responsible 
and irresponsible consumption. This frame included arguments that the AI is responsible[27, 36, 40, 
41] (for example that industry always encourages “responsible consumption”[40] and recognises “that 
responsible drinking is important both to [its] business interests and to society’s interests”[27]), that 
self-regulatory codes are “sufficient”[42], “robust”[40], “effective”[30, 40], “extraordinarily 
successful”[37], “faster”[27], and “better”[30] allowing the AI to deal quickly with, and rectify, any 
complaints or regulatory breeches[27, 41] and close regulatory “gaps”[27], and that the industry only 
markets to those of legal drinking age[27, 35, 36, 41]. Further, the AI appears to overstate the parallels 
between voluntary and statutory regulation for example by emphasising the independence of their 
(industry-funded) monitoring and adjudication groups[27].  
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This set of arguments overlaps with claims around personal responsibility and responsible drinking. 
The AI frequently attempts to shift the blame for alcohol misuse to the consumer and away from their 
products and marketing[32], arguing that there should be an individual-level focus on education and 
the promotion of responsible consumption[27, 29, 32] (and even that AI marketing itself has this 
aim[36]) and that their SAOs such as the DrinkAware Trust and the Portman Group provide 
information and education so that consumers can make “informed judgements” about how they use 
alcohol[27]; “misuse is caused by certain drinkers who clearly misuse alcohol and by some under 18s 
who are clearly breaking the law. This therefore is not a problem about problem drinks but about 
problem drinkers”[27]. The focus on a small number of alcohol misusers provides the AI with a frame 
that has the potential to invalidate the current focus of health policy; the AI argues that population-
level approaches, such as taxation or restrictions on advertising, penalises moderate drinkers because 
of a “few people” who consume alcohol in an irresponsible way and that these approaches do not 
tackle alcohol misuse effectively[27, 32, 41]. This supports AI claims that “existing regulation is 
satisfactory”[27, 40] or that it simply “requires better enforcement”[27, 30, 31]; “the panoply of 
powers available to the police and local authorities should be used much more effectively both against 
individuals who misuse alcohol and those who wilfully seek to break the law in obtaining alcohol 
underage, as well as against those retailers who sell alcohol irresponsibly”[27]. 
 
The argument that regulations are disproportionate and more extensive than necessary also rests on 
claims of personal responsibility and the inherent health risks of alcohol. In relation to health warnings 
in the UK it was stated that it is not “necessarily appropriate to have a health warning on a drink of 
alcohol. Alcohol is not like cigarettes; it is capable of being misused but when drunk in moderation it 
is perfectly compatible with a healthy lifestyle”[27]. This argument has also been used regarding 
minimum pricing[27], dealing with alcohol misuse[27], and raising the legal drinking age[32]. 
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Additionally the AI argues that the industry, its marketing, and alcohol itself, has a positive impact and 
should therefore not be regulated further: In Lesotho the AI argued that when used in moderation 
alcohol has a “positive role to play in socialisation” and that the industry is a “major contributor to the 
economy”[29]. In Milwaukee, USA, Miller Brewing argued that a product (beer) which forms a 
significant part of the local history should not be ‘demonised’[43]. In Australia the AI argued that 
“responsible advertising can have a positive cultural impact”[40] and highlighted the importance of 
the AI to communities as “funders of events”[41]. And in the UK the wine company Constellation 
argued that marketing could be used “to promote a more responsible approach to alcohol 
consumption”[27] (a very similar statement was also made in the USA by Philip Morris (tobacco) when 
they owned Miller Brewing[36]).  
 
Whilst actual legal action is rarely reported in the literature (see above), arguments questioning the 
legality of policies to curb AI marketing are more common. These arguments aim to shift the focus of 
the debate away from public health and consumer protection, with the AI contesting advertising 
regulations and minimum pricing proposals under international trade and investment agreements 
(UK[27] and Thailand[30]), national constitutions (USA[36]), and international law (UK[27]). 
 
The AI often argues that regulation would have negative unintended consequences for 
manufacturers[27, 30, 39, 41], associated industries[30, 41], the public revenue[41], and public 
health[27, 36, 40]. For example, in both Australia[40] and the UK[27], it was argued that advertising 
restrictions would make it impossible to introduce new, lower-strength products to the marketplace 
thereby stopping producers from developing and selling healthier products, and in the USA, the Beer 
Institute argued that mandated health warnings on alcohol products could “undermine the credibility 
of other government campaigns to provide information about serious risks which are not commonly 
known”[36]. The AI commonly avoids citing evidence to support such claims, suggesting that the aim 
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may simply be to exaggerate the broader political and economic risks associated with public health 
measures. 
 
The AI also emphasises the complications involved in addressing problems associated with alcohol 
consumption with a view to highlighting the value of industry-government co-operation[27, 29, 31, 
40]; it has “a unique capacity to access those responsible for promoting and selling alcohol as well as 
to those who consume their products”[29] and “partnership working can deliver a more responsible 
drinking culture”[27]. Although the AI advocate being closely involved in policymaking and alcohol 
harm reduction initiatives, they also stress that some issues are beyond the AI’s control; for example, 
preventing individual retailers from offering certain price promotions[27] that may be deemed 
irresponsible. Similarly the AI regularly characterises policymakers and public health actors as 
authoritarian (“the health lobby's approach is to ban everything, and if it cannot be banned, regulate 
it severely”[40]) with the Thai government being labelled a ‘dictatorship’ because of an advertising 
ban[30], and the Australian government being described as a “’nanny state’ needlessly interfering with 
people’s choices”[41].  
 
Questioning the strength of evidence favourable to public health policies is another common 
technique that has been used to oppose advertising bans transnationally[36], in Thailand[30], 
Australia[41], Ireland[31] and in the UK[27], minimum pricing in the UK[27], and health warning labels 
in the USA[39]. This argument is used to reinforce the other arguments made by the AI.  
 
Comparison between TI and AI political activity 
We identified 13 common tactics used by both the AI and TI[1] when attempting to influence 
marketing regulation, in addition to five tactics used only by the TI and seven unique to the AI. Similarly 
we also identified 13 common arguments used by both industries, along with four arguments unique 
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to the TI, and seven (three of which formed the new frame ‘complex policy area’), which had only 
been used by the AI (see further details included in Appendix S1).    
DISCUSSION 
This systematic review illustrates the varied nature of AI political activity used in attempts to influence 
marketing regulation or marketing-related policy debates, and highlights similarities with TI political 
activity. 
The results support the findings of the TI review[1] in highlighting the varied nature of industry political 
activity and provides further confirmation that Hillman and Hitt’s[22] model of corporate political 
activity, which is the most widely cited attempt to analytically categorise the tactics used by 
corporations, considerably under-represents the range of tactics corporations use to shape policy 
outcomes and debates. By identifying tactics/strategies, such as the promotion of self-regulatory 
codes and raising the prospect of litigation, the results also challenge Hillman and Hitt’s[22] 
assumption that corporate political activity represents one side of a mutually beneficial exchange 
relationship in which corporations offer policymakers support and information in return for 
influencing policy. 
The existing literature challenges the validity of many of the arguments identified in this review (see 
examples in Table 4). For example, despite the AI’s assertion that self-regulatory codes negate the 
need for formal regulation and that industry collaboration would be beneficial for policymakers, there 
is no evidence that self-regulation and industry-government partnerships lead to reductions in 
alcohol-related harm[19, 20, 25, 44]. Arguing that there is insufficient evidence supporting the need 
to curb AI marketing and that marketing does not change behaviour is also false as much research has 
found a significant link between AI marketing and drinking initiation and drinking prevalence[15-18]. 
Similarly, arguing that the AI does not market to children is misleading as research shows that AI 
marketing often targets and appeals to youth and those below legal drinking age[19, 34, 45, 46]. 
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 (TABLE 4) 
This review identifies marked similarities between TI and AI political activity[1]. Differences in the 
observed political activities of each industry may be due to a number of factors. First, raising concerns 
about compensation or debating which body has power to regulate (as the TI has done), for example, 
are arguments likely to be made in the face of impending regulation by companies which have lost the 
ability to exercise insider influence over policy discussions, reflecting greater TI regulation and 
differences in alcohol and tobacco policy contexts. Second, differences in framing may reflect 
variations in how different industries make similar points. For example, while the AI may not directly 
contest the health impacts of alcohol consumption, questions about the degree of harm caused by 
alcohol consumption are implicit in claims concerning individual responsibility and the health benefits 
of alcohol consumption. Third, differences may reflect differences in access to data; because of the 
availability of TI documents, information on lower visibility political activity, such as raising the 
prospect of legal action, is more available on the TI. Finally, differences may reflect the broader 
inclusion criteria used for the AI review (i.e. covering policy debates concerning marketing regulations 
generally rather than just new specific marketing policies), the inclusion of both primary and 
secondary evidence in the AI review, and differences in alcohol and tobacco policy contexts. For 
example, despite not being identified in the TI review there is evidence of the TI attempting to shape 
the evidence base[47-50], influencing international regulations[51, 52], and focussing on individual 
responsibility[53]. 
Consistent with the TI review findings[1], many of the individual arguments fall within a larger ‘cost-
benefit’ meta-frame which promotes the economic and social costs of proposed public health policies 
and underplays their benefits. Arguments claiming that regulation is more extensive than necessary 
and likely to produce negative unintended consequences are used to increase uncertainty about the 
likely benefits of regulation, and highlight the potential future costs for the industry, retailers, and the 
public revenue. This is also observed through the omission of a ‘health’ frame[54]; this review found 
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little evidence of the AI making reference to the dangers of drinking alcohol (only in terms of 
references to ‘problem drinkers’), although multiple examples of the AI highlighting the potential 
health benefits of alcohol consumption were identified[27, 32]. The review also found that many 
arguments were supported by CSR activities. CSR tends to be used strategically by an industry to 
prevent the introduction of legislation[55]. By acting as vehicles for the promotion of arguments, CSR 
activities such as self-regulatory codes work politically as agenda setting devices which frame issues 
and shape policy debates[55]. The AI’s emphasis on CSR highlights its value in maintaining industry 
credibility and forming relationships (CSR partnerships are likely to create further opportunities for 
co-operation[56])  ahead of regulation. 
Strengths and limitations 
This review has a number of limitations. First, although a broad search strategy and search string was 
used when initially identifying articles it is still possible that some relevant articles may have been 
missed. To minimise this, we worked with a librarian, searched online research repositories, and 
contacted experts in the field to identify additional articles. Second, interpretive coding of arguments 
and tactics is ultimately subjective. To mitigate this, all three authors reviewed and re-reviewed the 
coding at various points during the systematic review process and second-reviewed all of the included 
articles to ensure consistency. Third, the identification of tactics and arguments, and the jurisdictions 
in which they are used, is dependent on the available literature, its quality, and any publication bias. 
As such, it is possible that some tactics and arguments are not identified in or used more frequently 
than the literature would suggest. Closely related to this is the fact that the review focuses only on 
marketing policy and the AI may use a more diverse set of tactics and arguments in other policy areas. 
For these reasons the number of articles listed next to each tactic and argument (the ‘count’) should 
be used only as an indication of the reliance the AI places on particular tactics and arguments. Finally, 
due to limited information in the papers identified, it was not possible to reliably determine which 
tactics or arguments were most persuasive or successful in defeating marketing-related regulations.  
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The main strength of this review is its systematic approach, which provides a comprehensive and 
geographically diverse overview of AI tactics and arguments. Its attempt to rigorously categorise 
industry strategies/tactics and frames/arguments is, to our knowledge, along with our first paper[1], 
the first attempt to do so. Whilst care needs to be taken in assuming that tactics and arguments used 
in one jurisdiction will be used elsewhere, this and our previous review[1] suggest that the findings 
will be broadly applicable across different jurisdictions.  
Implications for policy, practice, and research 
This systematic review has identified strategies/tactics and frames/arguments used by the AI between 
1990 and 2013 to shape policy debates and prevent the implementation of restrictions on alcohol 
marketing. Policymakers need to be aware of these in order to understand how the AI may try to 
influence the policy-making process, and public health actors can use this information to prepare 
effective counter strategies and arguments. This review has also confirmed substantial commonalities 
between AI and TI political activity: particularly the use of obfuscating tactics such as misrepresenting 
the evidence base and using third parties and front groups to lobby. The similarities suggest that 
alcohol policy may benefit from reproducing efforts in tobacco control aimed at excluding corporate 
actors from the policy process and enhancing transparency. Additionally, as differences between the 
two industries are likely, at least in part, to be due to differences in alcohol and tobacco policy 
contexts, the findings from the TI review[1] may provide an indication of how AI political activity is 
likely to develop under conditions of increased regulatory risks. 
The current review has further developed the frameworks for classifying corporate political activity 
outlined in the earlier TI review[1], and shown the policy and scholarly value of applying them to other 
industries. Future work could apply these frameworks to other industries or policy areas. Based on 
limitations in the studies reviewed, we again recommend that future research on corporate policy 
influence should, where possible, include contextual information, ensure all claims made within the 
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paper are supported by empirical evidence, and that the receptivity of stakeholders to and the success 
or failure of individual tactics and arguments are recorded. 
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 Box 1 
 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
To be included in this review, studies and individual arguments/tactics had to fulfil the following 
criteria: 
 Studies must be written in English. 
 Studies must cover the period from 1990-2013. In papers that cover both before and 
after 1990, only those tactics/arguments relating to post-1990 will be recorded and 
included within this review. Political activity prior to 1990 is excluded to enable valid 
comparisons with the findings of our earlier review on the TI[1]. 
 Studies must look at AI efforts to influence a) policy debates concerning marketing 
regulations generally, or b) new specific marketing policies, or c) broader alcohol policy 
within which marketing is included (information regarding how the industry attempts to 
circumvent existing regulation will not be included within the review). 
 The tactics/arguments covered must be related to one or more of the following: product 
(for example, packaging, new products/flavours, branding), price* (for example, price 
promotions, minimum pricing), promotion (advertising including billboards, point-of-
sale, sponsorship), place (for example, restrictions on advertising near schools) or 
person (for example, restrictions on advertising or selling to youth). 
 Each individual claim made regarding AI tactics/arguments used to influence marketing 
regulation must be directly supported by verifiable evidence (either a clear citation that 
could be verified by the authors or a direct quote from an AI official or industry affiliated 
body). 
 Tactics/arguments identified must be directly implemented by the AI or by a group 
where substantiated evidence suggests that they act on the AI’s behalf. 
 Tactics/arguments which are noted within the included articles are assumed to have 
been carried through, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Tactics/arguments 
which are shown to only have been planned, and not used, will not be recorded. 
 Only tactics/arguments directly related to marketing regulation will be recorded. For 
example, health warning labels are included as they influence the means of packaging 
as a marketing tool, but they are excluded if the study only looks at, for example, the 
wording of the warning, as this does not affect marketing. 
 Only tactics/arguments that are clearly detailed in the paper(s) are coded. 
 
* Price in the form of tax has been excluded because tax-related lobbying was excluded from 
the systematic review of TI political activity[1] and we aimed to make the TI and AI reviews 
comparable. Price in terms of price-based promotions have been included. 
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Table 1: Geographical location of articles 
Geographical 
location 
Number of 
articles (%) 
Articles 
Africa 2 (12%) Sub-Saharan Africa [29]; South Africa [42] 
Asia 1 (6%) Thailand [30] 
Australasia 3 (18%) Australia [40] [41] [37] 
Europe 4 (24%) UK [27] [34]; Netherlands [38]; Ireland [31] 
North 
America 
3 (18%) USA  [35] [43]; Canada and USA [39] 
Transnational 4 (24%) Transnational [28] [36] [32]; OECD [57] 
Total 17  
 
 
Table 2: Strategies and tactics used by the alcohol industry when attempting to influence 
marketing regulation 
Strategy 
(total number 
of uses 
identified) 
Tactic 
Total number of 
articles, by 
geography* 
Information 
(32) 
Direct lobbying (meetings and correspondence with 
legislators/policymakers)  
Africa – 4 
[29] [29] [29] [29] 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Europe – 1 
[31] 
Indirect lobbying (using third parties, including front 
groups, to lobby on the industry’s behalf) 
Africa – 4 
[29] [29] [29] [29] 
Establishing industry/government collaboration (e.g. via 
working group, technical group, advisory group) / work 
alongside policymakers providing technical 
support/advice / policy development or implementation 
Africa – 4 
[29] [29] [29] [29] 
Evidence  
Adding to the 
evidence base 
or shaping its 
understanding 
Commissioning, writing (or 
ghost writing), or 
disseminating 
research/publications1 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Europe – 1 
[27] 
Transnational – 1 
[32] 
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Preparing position papers, 
technical reports or data 
on impacts (including 
economic impact studies) 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Europe – 1 
[31] 
Transnational – 1 
[32] 
Selective citation of 
industry-favourable 
evidence  
Europe – 2 
[27] [27] 
Transnational – 1 
[32] 
Omission of evidence 
Africa – 4 
[29] [29] [29] [29] 
Removing troubling 
phrases 
Transnational – 1 
[32]  
Contesting nature of the evidence 
Europe – 3 
[27] [27] [27] 
Transnational – 1 
[32] 
Constituency 
building 
(16) 
External constituency 
building 
Forming alliances with and 
mobilising other industry 
sectors/business/trade 
organisations 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
N.America – 1 
[35] 
Transnational – 2 
[36] [42] 
Media advocacy (press 
releases, publicity 
campaigns, public hearings, 
interviews) 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Europe – 1 
[31] 
Forming alliances with or 
mobilising unions/civil 
society organizations/ 
consumers/employees/the 
public 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
N.America – 1 
[35] 
Creation of front 
groups/astroturf/social 
aspect organisations 
Asia – 2 
[30] [30] 
N.America – 1 
[35] 
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Internal constituency 
building 
 Collaboration between 
companies / development 
of pan-industry group or 
industry trade association2 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Europe – 2 
[27] [34] 
Transnational – 2 
[36] [32] 
Policy substitution, development and 
implementation3 
(28) 
Developing/promoting 
non-regulatory initiative 
(generally seen to be 
ineffective/less effective, 
e.g. education 
programmes) 
Africa – 4 
[29] [29] [29] [29] 
Europe – 3 
[27] [27] [27] 
N.America – 2 
[39] [35] 
Transnational – 1 
[32] 
Developing/promoting 
(new or existing) voluntary 
code / self-regulation 
Africa – 4 
[29] [29] [29] [29] 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Australasia – 1 
[37] 
Europe – 6 
[31] [27] [27] [27] 
[34] [38] 
N.America – 1 
[35] 
Transnational – 1 
[28] 
Developing regulation from 
scratch and planning 
implementation 
Africa – 4 
[29] [29] [29] [29] 
Legal 
(3) 
Using litigation / raising the 
prospect of legal action 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Europe – 1 
[28] 
Shaping international law 
Transnational – 1 
[28] 
Financial incentive or disincentive 
(1) 
Threatening financial 
withdrawal 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
* This column shows the number of times each tactic was used by geography. If a tactic was 
referred to more than once (in one or more articles) regarding the same policy then it was only 
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counted once, however if it was referred to more than once about different policies then this was 
counted separately. 
1 Including research/publications intended to undermine or misrepresent existing evidence 
2 Routine use of a trade association was not counted, industry collaboration must have been more 
‘active’ 
3 Includes efforts to prevent the implementation of anticipated policies 
 
 
Table 3: Arguments used by the alcohol industry when attempting to influence marketing 
regulation 
Frame 
(total number of uses identified) 
Argument 
Total number of 
articles, by 
geography* 
Regulatory Redundancy 
(40) 
Industry adheres to own self-
regulation codes / self-regulation is 
working well or is better than formal 
regulation 
Africa – 1  
[42] 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Australasia – 3 
[40] [41] [37] 
Europe – 5 
[27] [27] [27] [27] 
[27] 
Transnational – 1 
[57] 
Industry only markets to those of legal 
age / is actively opposed to minors 
using product 
Australasia – 1 
[41] 
Europe – 1 
[27] 
N.America – 2 
[36] [35] 
Existing regulation is 
satisfactory/Existing regulation is 
satisfactory, but requires better 
enforcement 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Australasia – 1 
[40] 
Europe – 3 
[31] [27] [27] 
Industry is responsible 
Australasia – 3 
[40] [40] [41] 
Europe – 2 
[27] [27] 
N.America – 1 
[36] 
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Individuals should consume product 
responsibly / individual-level approach 
needed 
Africa – 1 
[29]  
Australasia – 1 
[41] 
Europe – 2 
[27] [27] 
N.America – 1 
[36] 
Transnational – 2 
[32] [32]  
Industry has positive impact 
Africa – 2 
[29] [29]  
Australasia – 2 
[40] [41] 
Europe – 1 
[27]  
N.America – 2 
[36] [43] 
Legal 
(8) 
Infringes legal rights of company 
(trademarks, intellectual property, 
constitutionally protected free speech 
(e.g. US First Amendment), 
international trade agreements) 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Europe – 1 
[27] 
N.America – 1 
[36] 
Regulation is more extensive than 
necessary / regulation is 
disproportionate 
Europe – 3 
[27] [27] [27] 
Transnational – 1 
[32] 
Interferes with a free market economy 
Europe – 1 
[27] 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
U
n
in
te
n
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ed
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o
n
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q
u
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ce
s 
(1
6)
 
Economic Manufacturers 
The cost of compliance for 
manufacturers will be high / the time 
required for implementation has been 
underestimated 
N.America – 1 
[39] 
Regulation will result in financial or 
job losses (among manufacturers) 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
The regulation is discriminatory / 
regulation will not affect all 
producers/customers equally  
Australasia – 1 
[41] 
Europe – 3 
[27] [27] [27] 
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Public 
Revenue 
Regulation will cause 
economic/financial problems (for city, 
state, country or economic area (e.g. 
European Union)) 
Australasia – 1 
[41] 
Associated 
industries 
Regulation will result in financial or 
job losses (among retailers and other 
associated industries, e.g. printing, 
advertising, leisure) 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Australasia – 1 
[41] 
Public Health 
Regulation will have negative public 
health consequences 
Australasia – 1 
[40] 
Europe – 2 
[27] [27] 
N.America – 1 
[36] 
Other 
Regulation could have other negative 
unintended consequences  
Europe – 2 
[27] [27] 
Transnational – 1 
[32] 
Complex Policy Area 
(13) 
Complicated/beyond Industry’s 
control 
Europe – 2 
[27] [27] 
Collaboration with Industry would be 
beneficial 
Africa – 4 
[29] [29] [29] [29] 
Australasia – 1 
[40] 
Europe – 2 
[31] [27] 
Characterising policymakers and 
public health actors as 
authoritarian/denigrating 
policymakers and public health actors 
Asia – 2 
[30] [30] 
Australasia – 2 
[40] [41] 
Insufficient Evidence 
(8) 
There’s insufficient evidence that the 
proposed policy will work / marketing 
doesn’t cause or change behaviour 
(it’s only used for brand selection and 
capturing market share), so regulation 
will have no effect 
Asia – 1  
[30] 
Australasia – 1 
[41] 
Europe – 3 
[31] [27] [27] 
N.America – 1 
[39] 
Transnational – 2 
[36] [57] 
* This column shows the number of times each argument was used by geography. If an argument 
was referred to more than once (in one or multiple articles) regarding the same policy then it was 
only counted once, however if it was referred to more than once about different policies then this 
was counted separately. 
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Table 4: Veracity of alcohol industry arguments 
Argument Commentary, and examples of evidence 
Industry adheres to own self-
regulation codes / self-regulation 
is working well or is better than 
formal regulation 
Contrary evidence of the former. Strong contrary evidence 
of the latter [25, 58-66] 
Industry only markets to those of 
legal age / is actively opposed to 
minors using product 
Strong contrary evidence of the former. Contrary evidence 
of the latter [63, 66-70] 
Existing regulation is 
satisfactory/Existing regulation is 
satisfactory, but requires better 
enforcement 
Strong contrary evidence. The available evidence indicates 
that the contemporary policy environment  in Europe and 
the US is ineffective in limiting both young people’s exposure 
to alcohol marketing and the general effect of marketing on 
alcohol related harm [60, 67, 69, 71, 72] 
Industry is responsible 
Strong contrary evidence. Proxy measures of responsibility 
such as young people’s exposure to alcohol marketing [67] 
and the weaknesses of industry self-regulation [60, 73] 
contradict claims of industry responsibility. 
Individuals should consume 
product responsibly / individual-
level approach needed 
Partially supported. There is some evidence of the 
effectiveness of individual-level interventions. Controlled 
trials of brief alcohol interventions, for example, have 
reported primarily positive outcomes on weekly drinking and 
a range of alcohol-related problems [74]. However, this 
argument is used to imply that population based measures 
are either ineffective or less effective than individual level 
interventions.  Studies of  the relative effectiveness of 
different types of policy interventions [44, 71] indicate that 
there is strong contrary evidence of this contention. 
Industry has positive impact 
No evidence/not researched. This assertion rests on narrow 
claims of social benefits associated with alcohol and the 
alcohol industry. There are no systematic analyses of the 
aggregate costs and benefits of current levels of alcohol 
consumptions (and, by implication, the alcohol industry as 
presently constituted). 
Infringes legal rights of company 
(trademarks, intellectual property, 
constitutionally protected free 
speech (e.g. US First Amendment), 
international trade agreements) 
No evidence / not researched. 
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Regulation is more extensive than 
necessary / regulation is 
disproportionate 
Strong contrary evidence [67, 69, 71, 73, 75] 
Interferes with a free market 
economy 
Equivocal. Restrictions on alcohol marketing are designed to 
manage externalities associated with the alcohol sector. 
The cost of compliance for 
manufacturers will be high / the 
time required for implementation 
has been underestimated 
No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, 
independently verified evidence of the compliance costs that 
accompany marketing regulation. 
Regulation will result in financial 
or job losses (among 
manufacturers) 
No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, 
independently verified evidence linking alcohol regulation to 
jobs losses in the industry. In principle, marketing 
restrictions may negatively affect employment in the alcohol 
and advertising sectors. Jobs losses that occur as a result of 
reduced earnings amongst alcohol producers (resulting from 
lower consumption), are likely to be offset by the creation of 
jobs in other parts of the economy which occurs when 
money which would otherwise be spent on alcohol is 
disbursed on other products. 
The regulation is discriminatory / 
regulation will not affect all 
producers/customers equally  
Equivocal. Marketing regulation need not be discriminatory 
if properly designed. However, its effects on producers and 
consumers is not likely to be equally felt. 
Regulation will cause 
economic/financial problems (for 
city, state, country or economic 
area (e.g. European Union)) 
No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, 
independently verified evidence of these effects. 
Regulation will result in financial 
or job losses (among retailers and 
other associated industries, e.g. 
printing, advertising, leisure) 
No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, 
independently verified evidence of the compliance costs that 
accompany marketing regulation. 
Regulation will have negative 
public health consequences 
No evidence/not researched. There is no evidence to 
suggest that alcohol restrictions will have aggregate negative 
public health consequences. 
Regulation could have other 
negative unintended 
consequences  
No evidence/not researched. Risks of negative unintended 
consequences resulting from policy innovation cannot be 
discounted. The important policy questions, however, 
concern the probability of these risks and whether negative 
outcomes associated with policy innovation outweigh its 
social benefits. There is no publicly available, independently 
verified evidence on these issues. 
Complicated/beyond Industry’s 
control 
Contrary evidence Alcohol related harm is multiple-causal. 
However, when viewed against studies on the relationship 
between marketing and consumption (see above) studies 
outlining the volume [59] and focus of industry marketing 
31 
 
[69, 76] suggest that marketing is a key driver of aggregate 
levels of consumption and, therefore, alcohol related harm. 
Collaboration with Industry would 
be beneficial 
Contrary evidence [60, 77, 78] 
Characterising policymakers and 
public health actors as 
authoritarian/denigrating 
policymakers and public health 
actors 
Unable to comment. 
There’s insufficient evidence that 
the proposed policy will work / 
marketing doesn’t cause or 
change behaviour (it’s only used 
for brand selection and capturing 
market share), so regulation will 
have no effect 
Strong contrary evidence [16, 71, 79, 80] 
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